President Trump’s foreign policy envoy on Thursday criticized those who are trying to undermine the president’s negotiations to place limits on Iran’s nuclear program, saying they have a “bias toward military action,” adding that he and Trump instead wanted to put diplomacy first in U.S. foreign relations.
“In their minds, anything that is of a military nature to be a solution to that problem, they have a bias towards that. They give no consideration whatsoever on what the consequences are on that,” envoy Steven Witkoff said during an interview with Breitbart. “The neocon element believes that war is the only way to solve things.”
Trump “believes in peace through strength, which essentially means that resorting to violence and war is not necessarily in the best interest of the country and not necessarily the best way to effect truces, ceasefires, permanent peace — whatever we want to call it,” Witkoff added. “Dialogue and diplomacy are an avenue he wants to pursue each and every time because if he can get to a successful resolution that’s in the best interest of the United States.”
Witkoff’s comments come as more hawkish establishment conservatives are orchestrating a campaign to oppose the Trump administration’s diplomacy with Iran. But the White House and its allies are pushing back.
More recently, Trump reportedly fired his national security adviser Mike Waltz because Waltz was pushing for war with Iran in internal conversations on the issue. And Trump allies outside the administration — like Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) and conservative media star Tucker Carlson — have been increasingly vocal in criticizing Iran hawks.
Meanwhile, House and Senate Republicans this week started pushing their colleagues to call for only a full dismantlement of Iran’s program.
Witkoff appeared to push back on that effort during his interview with Breitbart while stressing a diplomacy-first approach.
“I believe in [Trump’s] policy of attempting to settle the Iranian conflict through dialogue. First of all, that’s a more permanent solution to that crisis than any other alternative,” he said. “If we get them [Iran] to voluntarily shift away from an enrichment program where they can enrich to not have centrifuges, to not have material that can be enriched to weapons-grade levels 90%. If we can get them to voluntarily do that, that is the most permanent way to make sure that they never get a weapon."
Stavroula Pabst is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft.
Top image credit: US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff speaks to reporters outside the West Wing of the White House in Washington, DC on March 6, 2025. (Photo by Oliver Contreras/Sipa USA)/ Reuters Connect
Top photo credit: Specialists of emergency services work at the scene, after a road bridge collapsed onto railway tracks due to an explosion in the Bryansk region, Russia, June 1, 2025. REUTERS/Stringer
A little over forty years ago, while preparing for a weekly radio address, President Ronald Reagan famously cracked wise about the possibility of attacking the Soviet Union. “I have signed legislation that outlaws Russia forever,” he said. “We begin bombing in five minutes.”
Reagan had not realized that the studio microphone was recording his joke and that technical personnel preparing for the broadcast in stations across the country were already listening. His facetious remarks were leaked. The public reaction was immediate, strong, and negative. Democratic candidate Walter Mondale admonished his election opponent for ill-considered humor, and Reagan’s polling numbers took a temporary hit.
For many, the possibility of thermonuclear annihilation was no joking matter.
Within a few short years, history veered in a much more positive direction, and concerns about either superpower pressing “the button” by accident or by design began to recede. A reelected Reagan and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev launched a set of historic accords that greatly reduced the risk of superpower war. The Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended, and the USSR dissolved. For many Americans, the threat of nuclear conflict faded into distant memory.
Today, we encounter those Cold War fears primarily through history books. Fewer and fewer people recall nail-biting over the Cuban Missile Crisis or sheltering under desks in elementary schools. Many have not heard about the controversy over Reagan’s radio gaffe. Millennials and Generation Z wonder why their parents and grandparents worried about a nuclear Armageddon that never, in fact, materialized.
There may be no better illustration of our much-relaxed contemporary attitudes than the public reaction to Ukraine’s surprise attacks last week on dozens of Russian strategic bombers located at bases thousands of kilometers from Ukraine. On June 1, Ukraine used swarms of drones hidden in trucks smuggled across Russia’s border to attack one leg of its nuclear triad of missiles, submarines, and aircraft.
This time, the bombing was no joke. But the Western reaction hardly took the prospect of nuclear escalation seriously.
The operation was “a brilliant technical performance” that showed “why Ukraine will win this war,” according to French philosopher Bernard Henri-Levy writing in the Wall Street Journal. Rebecca Grant, vice president of the Lexington Institute, posted on the Fox News site that Americans should “savor Ukraine’s brilliant strike on Putin’s terror bombers. Too bad Ukraine can’t do it again. Or can they?”
The Washington Post editorialized that the operation showed that Ukrainians are “tough, determined – and right. Theirs is a fight the United States should be proud to support.” Legions of online armchair warriors praised Ukraine’s “bad-ass operation” that will “go down in history” and be “studied for years to come.”
Such reactions largely ignored the impact that such attacks might have on nuclear stability between the United States and Russia, which together hold more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.
After former President Joe Biden authorized Ukraine’s use of American weapons for strikes into Russia in 2024, Moscow published a revised nuclear weapons doctrine last fall. No longer would it require a nuclear strike or an attack threatening Russia’s existence to trigger a nuclear response; under the new doctrine, Russia could use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that simply undermined Russia’s retaliatory nuclear-strike capability. And it noted specifically that an attack by a non-nuclear state carried out with the support of a nuclear power would be considered a joint attack.
That doctrine seemed designed to deter the very kind of operation that Ukraine carried out. In crossing that redline, Kyiv confronted Russia with a vexing security conundrum. A retaliation perceived as excessively destructive might persuade Trump to reinforce Washington’s military support for Ukraine, trigger a new wave of toughened sanctions, or even draw the U.S. or NATO directly into the war. Too weak a response could signal that Russia is in practice a paper tiger, too timid to enforce its own redlines if the West were to support a sustained campaign of deep strikes into Russia or deploy European forces inside Ukraine.
That conundrum approximates the very situation that another U.S. president, John Kennedy, warned explicitly against in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. “Nuclear powers,” he said, “must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”
Yet there have been no Greta Thunbergs railing at the irresponsibility of political leaders who flirt with the possibility of a world-shaking nuclear collision. Just the opposite. Most of the West, and most of Washington, greeted Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s strategic bombers with the equivalent of a standing ovation.
That lack of worry has itself long been a source of concern in Moscow. Dmitry Trenin, once a leading Russian advocate of improved relations with the United States, lamented last year that “the restraining fear of the atomic bomb … is gone. Nuclear weapons are left aside. The practical conclusion from this is obvious: there is no need to be afraid of Russia’s reaction. This is an extremely dangerous misperception.”
To restore the deterrent effect of nuclear fears, another prominent Russian expert, Sergei Karaganov, has called for nuclear strikes against Ukraine and the West. Dimitri Suslov, an expert on U.S.-Russia relations at Russia’s prestigious Higher School of Economics, has called for a publicly conducted nuclear explosion in Russia to sober up the West.
So far, Putin has not accepted this advice, opting instead to use conventional drones, bombs, and missiles to strike Ukrainian airbases and military plants in response to Operation Spiderweb. President Trump’s phone call explaining that his administration had no knowledge or involvement in the Ukrainian operation probably helped temper Putin’s response, as did Trump’s insistence that he wants to continue efforts to improve bilateral relations.
But American officials have warned that Russia’s response is probably not over, and Ukraine has signaled that it has no intention of ending attacks on Russia’s strategic forces. The more Ukraine makes a show out of crossing Russian redlines, the greater will be the pressure on Putin to draw a very hard line in response.
Unlike the Reagan gaffe, such a development would hardly be a laughing matter.
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Top photo credit: U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee visits the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest prayer site, in Jerusalem's Old City, April 18, 2025. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun
As the Trump administration continues to try to broker a nuclear deal with Iran, Israel’s president Benjamin Netanyahu has not been a willing partner in those efforts.
The two spoke Monday evening, but Israel’s government has threatened strikes on Iran that could upend a deal. When Trump bypassedIsrael on his Middle East trip last month, many saw it as a snub to Netanyahu.
Trump appears eager for some sort of deal, whether Israel’s current government likes it or not.
So why would the U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee expend energy (and taxpayer resources) talking to Netanyahu’s anti-Iran, hardline coalition members to ensure they keep don’t jump ship, threatening his government and power?
According to The Times of Israel on Tuesday, Huckabee met with ultra-Orthodox Haredi members of the coalition in the Knesset who have threatened to dissolve the government. These members have said they might leave Netnayahu’s coalition over the lack of an exemption to the draft for members of its community.
Huckabee reportedly told the group, "Government stability is important for addressing the Iranian issue.” It was not clear why Netanyahu's political survival would be important when it came to Iran.
Huckabee also reportedly told the Knesset group, "it would be difficult for the U.S. to back Israel if elections are held now.”
It is not exactly clear what Huckabee meant in saying this, as if U.S. support for the country was contingent upon who wins its elections.
Huckabee also said Tuesday that the U.S. no longer supports establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank, saying there’s “no room for it” and that it will likely not occur “in our lifetime.” This is also the long held position of Israel’s president, but not an official U.S. one.
Moreover, President Trump, Huckabee’s boss, has not been as clear as his ambassador appeared to be Tuesday on the issue of a Palestinian state.
Huckabee denies injecting himself into Israel’s internal politics, which would be a peculiar move for a U.S. official in the midst of his own country’s delicate diplomacy with an Israeli adversary.
“The report also said it was not clear if Huckabee was acting under U.S. President Donald Trump’s instructions or on his own initiative," the Israel Times report said, referring to Channel 13 in Israel, which broke the initial story on Huckabee's talk with the Haredi, "adding that Netanyahu was aware of the U.S. envoy’s outreach and pleased by it.”
Huckabee is an avowed Christian Zionist who has said in the past that there is no such thing is a Palestinian. But he now represents the policies of the president and the United States, not any other state or its government.
Opposition Leader Yair Lapid pondered the same observation, saying he hoped the report was not correct.
“Since I have no doubt that Ambassador Huckabee respects Israel’s independence and its democracy, I hope and believe that the report that he is interfering in Israel’s internal politics and trying to help Netanyahu [deal with] the ultra-Orthodox in the military draft law crisis are not true," Lapid shared on X. "Israel is not a protectorate.”
Huckabee attempted to clarify later Tuesday that he was not interfering. “There has been no attempt to influence Haredi Knesset members regarding a decision to dissolve the government,” Huckabee wrote on X. “I have repeatedly said in private conversations that it is not the role of the United States, nor of its Ambassador, to try and choose the government of Israel.”
Lapid shared the ambassador’s post, adding, “We are grateful to Ambassador Huckabee for this important statement that he has not, and will not, get involved in the coalition crisis here in Israel.”
But if the report is credible, Lapid had good reason to be skeptical of Huckabee’s non-intervention and impartiality claims.
So might President Trump.
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Top image credit: EVERETT (WA), USA – JANUARY 30 2015: Unidentified Boeing employees continue work building its latest Boeing 777 jets at its Everett factory (First Class Photography / Shutterstock.com)
As the U.S. and Iran engage in fraught rounds of nuclear talks, deep distrust, past failures, and mounting pressure from opponents continue to hinder progress. Washington has reverted to its old zero-enrichment stance, a policy that, in 2010, led Iran to increase uranium enrichment from under 5% to 20%. Tehran remains equally entrenched, insisting, “No enrichment, no deal, No nuclear weapons, we have a deal.”
In Washington, the instinct is to tighten the screws on Tehran, make military threats credible, and explore strike options to force capitulation. Yet history shows that these coercive tactics often fail. Sanctions have not secured compliance and have proven costly to U.S. interests. Military strikes are unlikely to dismantle Iran’s nuclear capabilities; instead, they risk convincing Tehran to pursue the development of nuclear weapons.
Breaking this impasse requires a strategic pivot from punishment to pragmatic economic engagement. Economic incentives are not rewards; they are essential diplomatic tools. By directly linking benefits to verified nuclear compliance, Washington can foster real cooperation and strengthen U.S. security. And it would be a real boon for both U.S. and Iran markets, which have been closed off from each other for decades.
The limits of sanctions-only diplomacy
The sanctions-first strategy sought to convert foreign economic pressure into domestic political upheaval, forcing political capitulation. In reality, sanctions have impoverished ordinary Iranians without significantly altering the regime’s calculus. Rather than capitulation, Iran has advanced its nuclear capabilities and developed a sophisticated sanctions-evasion network.
Despite significant economic hardship, Iran has maintained a modest annual economic growth rate of 4% since 2020. However, this growth conceals more profound economic challenges. Persistent inflation ranging from 30% to 40% and budget deficits between 20% and 25% have forced the government into unsustainable financial practices, such as printing money and imposing heavy taxes on the private sector, which worsen the country’s ongoing stagflation. Although sitting on some of the world’s largest energy reserves, Iran struggles with significant energy inefficiencies and shortages due to a lack of investment.
With no viable domestic political backlash, Iran’s leadership prefers “resistance” to capitulation with no payoff, calculating it can outlast sanctions as long as no real benefits are on offer. To change this calculation, the U.S. must offer targeted economic advantages to Iranian elites and citizens, creating domestic pressure for compliance and coexistence. This does not mean abandoning sanctions or rewarding adversarial behavior; rather, it involves strategically linking economic gains to verified nuclear restrictions.
By clearly tying diplomatic compliance to tangible economic improvements, Washington can build powerful constituencies in both countries committed to preserving the deal. I explain this in a new brief for the Quincy Institute entitled, "The Economic Dimensions of a Better Iran Deal."
Economic engagement as a catalyst for change
A growing number of Iranian elites now believe that unlocking Iran’s geo-economic potential and addressing escalating economic challenges hinges on the U.S. economic engagement. While military-linked hardliners resist any economic ties with America, most elites have reluctantly recognized that even under a JCPOA-like deal, partnerships with non-U.S. economies remain fragile without U.S. involvement.
Hardliners understand that greater openness would erode the power of military-linked conglomerates and undermine the rationale of economic militarization. Meanwhile, moderates acknowledge that Iran’s economy requires a durable deal that includes strong American constituencies with vested interests in maintaining sanctions relief.
Targeted economic incentives could deepen these elite divisions and pressure Tehran toward compliance.
A flexible, incentive-driven framework
A practical step includes launching an economic dialogue parallel to the technical nuclear discussions to explore options for selectively opening Iran’s substantial consumer market to American businesses. Even without fully repealing primary sanctions laws, President Trump can selectively license up to $25 billion in annual U.S. exports and enable U.S.-owned subsidiaries to engage with up to $4 trillion in untapped Iranian investment opportunities by 2040.
Licensing up to $25 billion annually in U.S. exports, particularly in aviation, agriculture, and automobiles, could create and sustain over 200,000 American jobs each year. Beyond this $25 billion export figure, Iran needs to immediately import approximately $180 billion worth of equipment and machinery to renovate just 30 percent of its outdated industrial base, $50 to $60 billion to expand and upgrade its electric transmission and distribution systems, and another $60 billion to modernize and expand its rail network. If permitted, these imports could be sourced primarily from the U.S. market.
Facilitating these exchanges provides durable incentives for both sides. Reinstating Boeing deals could revitalize manufacturing hubs in Washington and South Carolina. Similarly, American farmers, especially in the Midwest, would directly benefit from increased agricultural exports to Iran, where billions of dollars’ worth of staple commodities such as soybeans and corn are consistently imported.
Beyond immediate trade benefits, Washington can authorize a new General License H, providing a five-year window for U.S.-owned subsidiaries to operate in Iran’s designated sectors. With the largest untapped market in the Middle East, without sanctions, Iran could add $600 billion to $1 trillion in GDP by 2040. Meeting these goals requires $2.3 to $4 trillion in capital by 2040. Allowing indirect American investments, without repealing primary sanctions laws, provides a pragmatic, politically feasible pathway to integrate Iran’s economy into a broader regional economic network. As the payback period for most Iranian projects with a high return rate is less than five years, if compliance endures, it can be extended or evolve into permanent relief. It gives U.S. businesses a foothold while preserving leverage.
Engaging regional partners such as Saudi, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE to participate in joint ventures with American subsidiaries could further amplify the deal’s economic and geopolitical benefits. This regional economic cooperation would bolster stability across the Persian Gulf and raise Iran's costs if it breaches compliance terms, significantly strengthening diplomatic leverage.
A dynamic “snap-forward” mechanism could also be introduced, allowing Iran’s economic openings to accelerate as Tehran demonstrates sustained compliance and cooperation. This incentive-driven approach contrasts sharply with the reactive, punitive “snap-back” sanctions of previous agreements, creating a positive, mutually reinforcing cycle of compliance and reward.
Anchoring nuclear diplomacy in economic incentives offers U.S. policymakers a chance to achieve security goals that decades of coercion alone have failed to deliver. When tied to verifiable compliance, economic benefits become powerful leverage to force sustained Iranian compliance. Now, Washington faces a choice: double down on a sanctions-driven strategy with a track record of failure, or embrace a smarter, incentive-based policy that brings nuclear security, regional stability, and economic gains for American workers.
It’s time to recognize the limits of sanctions-only diplomacy and prioritize economic engagement as the foundation of a more effective Iran strategy for lasting security and diplomatic stability.
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